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1 Notes

New Song - Nation in Arms

Check out my latest song NATION IN ARMS!

This song is two years in the making, having undergone a number of facelifts along the way to make everything fit together just right. Let me know what you think!

More new music to come soon…

2 Notes

New Song - Dragonfly

More new music! This one’s called Dragonfly.

This is a really special song to me. It’s about how much I love music and how an accident a couple of years ago almost lost me my singing voice. But in the end, I realized that, no matter the outcome, I still needed to be happy with who I am.

Hope you like it! Let me know what you think.

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The Thing About Online Privacy

According to abine.com, I’m only worth $28 to Facebook. I’m so undervalued, I could attempt to cry. It won’t work, however…

Abine has put together an online tool that estimates how much ad and market research revenue you (presumably a Facebook user because we all just…are) generate for Facebook based on your usage of the social network. It factors in things such as number of friends, how often you post photos, etc. Do check it out if you’re curious.

Abine then of course directs you to learn more about its online privacy service, which is explained rather clearly with help from an animated video. It asks: imagine someone threw a spy-movie-esque tracking device into your purse or bag and continuously gathered data on what stores you shopped at, what books you signed out of the library - everything. The data would then be stored forever and exploited by an evil corporation far, far away, unbeknownst to you. What would you do?

Of course, this is what Facebook does - minus all the hyperbole. 

We’ve heard these warnings for years. Facebook itself was subject to considerable scrutiny between 2007-2009 on the data exploitation and privacy issue, with extensive reports all over television news and the Internet.

Few heeded those warnings. Today Facebook has over 900 million users worldwide and rising. Question is - why? Here’s my guess. 

If you watch the Abine video I describe above, they go beyond the analogy of the tracking device and explain how cookies can be installed on your Internet browser unknowingly as you browse the web. Sometimes these are helpful, for example, when they remember your login information for a particular service. Other times, however, they track your browsing activity. Facebook is high on cookies (I hope that headline one day ends up on CNN, thinking its clever). 

Most of us simply don’t care if our Internet behaviour and data is exploited for market purposes because it is not being used against us personally. It is not being used to harm us and is not being exposed to people that we actually know - our friends, family, coworkers, and employers (presuming that you actually keep an eye on evolving privacy features). Instead, we get grouped into huge market research brackets, based on indicators such as age and location, and sold en masse to the highest bidder. 

So it comes down to this: until there are personal consequences for our actions online, we’ll continue to feed the machine. 

2 Notes

Jason Russell

My support for Invisible Children’s Kony 2012 campaign has not been a secret. The incident involving co-founder Jason Russell is unfortunate and is obviously not representative of how a leading activist should behave. I can imagine that the global attention and criticism that the organization has received has put a huge strain on its leadership, but never thought it would manifest in this way. At the same time, it’s possible Jason may have significant health issues - exacerbated by the past two weeks’ events - that we simply don’t know about. 

All that being said, I don’t care much for scandals and don’t think this should validate the critics. There’s simply no way anyone could have predicted this would happen. My main concern is that the policies Invisible Children has been promoting to disarm the LRA are going to be discredited. I have made clear in previous entries that I think the approach they’ve adopted is the only option left to remove Kony, as he has proven time and again that he is not interested in peacebuilding or remedying the injustices committed against northern Ugandans. Other organizations agree.

I sincerely hope this doesn’t turn back the global momentum built for ending this war. 

6 Notes

On Oversimplification of Kony 2012

Now that it seems like we’re on the downswing in terms of the hysteria surrounding Invisible Children’s Kony 2012 campaign, I wanted to write a follow up to my open letter specifically pertaining to the argument that the organization has inappropriately oversimplified the LRA conflict. This has emerged as the dominant critique over the past couple of days. 

Just as almost every single writer I’ve read on this has, somewhere near the beginning of their pieces, stated something to the effect of, ‘Just to be clear, Kony is a war criminal,’ please allow me to be sure: in the Kony 2012 film, IC has oversimplified the LRA conflict. It doesn’t explain the original impetus for the conflict, which stems all the way back to the British colonial era. It ignores the original political motivations behind the formation and early fighting of the LRA, which was originally made up largely of former President Obote (1981-1986) loyalists and was fueled by the disenfranchisement of Acholis. The film ignores the extreme complexities surrounding the issue of child soldiers, who are simultaneously both the victims and perpetrators of heinous crimes, which leaves much to be resolved once they are able to break free from rebel armies. And among other issues, the footage in Uganda is dated and there is little perspective from civilians beyond Jacob. 

But does it all matter within the scope of this one particular campaign? I say no. 

Looking Beyond Just the Kony 2012 Film

IC never thought this campaign would explode as it did. Millions of people, who never knew of the organization, now do. Unfortunately, the consequence has been that IC’s views, its policy positions, its understanding of central African history and politics have all been, to a significant extent, judged strictly within the confines of one 30 minute film. 

I encourage the critics - who have no qualms about spending their time getting a cut of the action - to go outside the one film and actually read about the official policy positions that IC has adopted, the goals it hopes to achieve, the work it does now not just in Uganda but also in the DRC, and even just watch some of the other films it has produced previously.  

For example, this short clip about the history of the LRA, released in Oct 2011:

While this clip is also simplified for accessibility’s sake and ignores the roots of the conflict, I think it provides a short history that effectively describes the LRA’s crimes. 

At the very least, it puts to rest the silly ‘gotcha’ point against the Kony 2012 film that the LRA doesn’t even reside in Uganda anymore and hasn’t for years - as if that makes Kony’s crimes any less deplorable and the need for action any less dire. It also implicitly accuses IC of not understanding the regional nature of the conflict. Perhaps these critics are unaware that the organization operates in the DRC as well as in Uganda. Furthermore, just because the LRA has been expelled from northern Uganda, does that mean the game is over and we should leave defenceless civilians in South Sudan, the DRC and the CAR lambs to the slaughter? 

Let me now direct you to this letter to President Obama sent by IC, the Resolve and Enough, which outlines their policy positions and explains the nature of the Kony 2012 campaign.

… we fear that unless existing U.S. efforts are further expanded, your strategy may not succeed. The Ugandan and other regional militaries pursuing LRA commanders and groups continue to face daunting challenges. Their operations are hamstrung by flagging political will, weak cross-border coordination, the absence of tactical airlift, and the withdrawal of more than half of the Ugandan troops initially deployed to the field. Moreover, bureaucratic inertia and cuts in the U.S. foreign assistance budget have drastically limited the scope of non-military aspects of the strategy’s implementation, which are equally important to the pursuit of lasting peace in the region. 

[..]

First, we encourage you to sustain the deployment of U.S. advisors until the LRA no longer poses a serious threat to civilians. While regional governments are primarily responsible for the protection of their own citizens, the presence of U.S. advisors in the region is enhancing cross-border information flows, providing valuable guidance for regional military operations, and provoking an unprecedented level of political interest in what has historically been a neglected crisis. Though no serious gains have been made in reducing the LRA’s threat to civilians in the months since the advisors were deployed, reports from LRA defectors – and data showing a marked decrease in LRA attacks in the second half of 2011 – indicate that heightened U.S. and international interest may nonetheless be deterring the group from committing large-scale attacks. Premature withdrawal of the advisors would jeopardize these gains and likely trigger drawdowns in the efforts of other governments as well. The duration of their deployment should instead be determined by progress made in securing the apprehension of Joseph Kony and other senior commanders and the demobilization of LRA fighters and abductees.

Secondly, we encourage you to utilize funds that Congress has made available to help your Administration address the gaps in current efforts outlined above. In the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, $35 million was authorized to strengthen regional efforts to protect civilians and pursue top LRA commanders. These funds should be used to provide enhanced mobility, intelligence, and other support for ongoing operations, though it is crucial that any beneficiaries be monitored closely and held accountable for abuses committed against the civilian population or any other illicit activities.

Congress also directed in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 that up to $10 million be used for programs that provide early warning to communities vulnerable to LRA attacks, help LRA abductees escape peacefully, and enhance telecommunications and road infrastructure in affected areas. The absence of basic infrastructure is key to the LRA’s ability to perpetrate mass atrocities. As such, it is vital that your Administration utilize the full $10 million to expand existing efforts in these areas, which currently benefit only a small fraction of the affected population. Programs to increase LRA defections – such as direct outreach to LRA commanders, expanded radio programming, aerial leafleting, the establishment of safe zones for surrender, and community sensitization – are a particularly important and underutilized means of reducing the

LRA’s capacity to attack civilians. In Central African Republic (CAR), where most LRA commanders are currently located, no such efforts exist; U.S. military advisors are uniquely positioned to help expand these activities in CAR.

Lastly, increased diplomatic efforts are needed to ensure regional governments are committed to protecting the communities in Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and CAR being targeted by LRA attacks. The Congolese government, in particular, has sought to actively downplay the LRA’s presence and impact on Congolese communities. Moreover, Uganda withdrew more than half of the forces initially deployed to pursue LRA commanders and groups, and their forces are no longer allowed to operate in Congo, where the LRA is committing the majority of attacks on civilians. We implore you to engage directly with the Presidents of each of the four countries – in partnership with the African Union – to enhance regional cooperation, increase the numbers and capabilities of troops deployed to LRA-affected areas, and boost efforts to encourage defections from the rebel group. The Secretary of State should also be working to secure additional support for regional efforts from European and other donor nations.

First of all, does this sound like the simplified musings of self-serving, uninformed surfer bimbos from San Diego? It should also be clear why the Kony 2012 campaign is set out as it is. There is legitimate concern that, in a US election year, support for action against the LRA could easily dissipate if public support wanes. IC is obviously concerned what might happen if the Republican candidate takes the White House in a period of economic austerity. Thus - they want to make Kony famous in order to get him on a one-way ticket to the Hague before new events can turn back the progress made in defeating the LRA. 

I support the kind of measured military action with regional coordination outlined in the letter above. In my open letter, I explained why there is no recourse to this given that Kony has proven that he has no earthly desires other than to survive and maintain his power in the jungle. Any political grievances that he had are a story of the past. Is it easier said than done? Absolutely. Kony will likely not surrender quietly and his death is certainly a possible outcome of any military operation to remove him from the battlefield. But to be clear, I want to see him face justice at the ICC.

Removing Kony is Not the End of the LRA

This is a loaded statement that needs to be broken down.

The LRA is not al-Qaeda and removing Kony would not be like taking out Bin Laden. The LRA has no overarching ideology that binds its membership together at this point. The outstanding political and economic grievances held by the Acholi community against the Museveni government were all largely addressed in the 2008 Juba Peace Accord that Kony refused to sign. Were Kony to be removed, I’m not suggesting that the LRA would instantly cease to exist. For example, his other long-time senior commanders, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, also wanted by the ICC, could attempt to regroup and carry out reprisals. But it would not go on like al-Qaeda has beyond Bin Laden and perhaps even beyond Zawahiri were he to be captured or killed. Indeed, I would argue that the LRA would steadily disintegrate following the removal of Kony’s absolute rule. 

Now, anybody aware of the history of the conflict might say: since Kony and the LRA picked up right where Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirit Movement left off in the late 80s, who’s to say that somebody else won’t follow in Kony’s footsteps? Sure. If current regional vulnerabilities are not addressed, I’m sure someone will figure out that the territory and its people can be exploited with ease. However, there is a significant difference between then and now. The conflict is no longer a Ugandan civil war rooted in the political, economic, and ethnic tensions between north and south; it is a regional war being waged by criminals and forcibly abducted civilians in the name of no particular cause. 

But no matter what happens - and this is the key point here that has been manipulated by IC’s critics - IC has never suggested that international involvement can and should end once Kony is removed. In fact, it’s only the beginning of a long and difficult peacebuilding process that will require the reintegration of former LRA combatants back into their home communities, that reconciliation be fostered, economic development promoted and a renewed effort be initiated to resolve the longstanding political grievances between northern and southern Ugandans. And all of that doesn’t even begin to touch on the lingering challenges that will need to be dealt with in the DRC and other affected areas. If IC didn’t recognize all of this, why would it have already initiated school-building and microcredit programs in Uganda and the DRC?

Will IC’s work be enough to accomplish all of that? Of course not. Are there other great organizations able to contribute? Absolutely. 

But What About the Ugandan Government’s Human Rights Record?

In my open letter, I acknowledged the horrendous human rights record of the Ugandan government. It’s my position that regardless of when Kony is removed, the government needs to investigate members of the UPDF accused of committing atrocities or defer to the ICC. Furthermore, the government needs to undergo serious democratic reform.

But what I can’t accept is how, by omitting this side of the story from the Kony 2012 film, IC can somehow be accused of being less concerned about UPDF abuses than those committed by the LRA. This kind of reasoning is an affront to human rights activists and NGOs everywhere. If some NGO was focusing on LGBT rights in Iran, should we assume they care less about those rights in Uganda? Unfortunately no single actor can solve all the world’s problems in one fell swoop. However, this doesn’t mean that each of us shouldn’t take up a cause and start somewhere. And I think that the first ICC indicted war criminal is as good a place as any. 

Oversimplified and All - Are We Better Off Having Seen the Kony 2012 Film?

Are you kidding? Of course. Millions of people now know a little bit about the LRA conflict and have an impetus to go learn more and possibly even take action through fundraising or further awareness raising.

There is no question that the film wouldn’t have reached as far as it did without making the issues simple and accessible to a general audience. However, doing so should not be interpreted as an enunciation of the white man’s burden. To me, that is the ultimate oversimplification of Kony 2012.

21 Notes

An Open Letter to Kony 2012 Critics

Last night, we witnessed the global emergence of probably one of the fastest spreading social media campaigns ever. Since the LRA conflict is an area I’ve studied extensively in my master’s work, I was particularly overwhelmed by how many of my friends had watched the Kony 2012 film, passed it on, and committed to attending an April 20th ‘Cover the Night’ event in their city.

As I mentioned in a previous entry, Joseph Kony was the first war criminal indicted by the ICC in 2004 and his group continues to needlessly terrorize civilians in the DRC, South Sudan, and the CAR, so that it can maintain power in a climate of fear. In political circles, there is a rare amount of agreement surrounding this issue and what needs to be done. Kony needs to be arrested or killed, the LRA needs to be dismantled, and affected areas need to be reconstituted through reconciliation and economic development as well as through the reintegration of former LRA combatants into their communities, especially child soldiers. 

The problem has always been finding the political will to take action in a part of the world that offers little in terms of strategic interests to the West. This is why awareness is so important. Further, since the conflict is indelibly tied to the ICC, how it plays out will have a critical impact on the credibility of such an important global institution and its ability to prosecute war criminals in the future. 

Yet with so much at stake, beginning last night and continuing throughout today, there has been a sizable backlash to the Kony 2012 campaign, both on Facebook and Twitter and all over the web, including through the reposting of older articles. A number of general themes have emerged, which I’d like to address.

Suspicions About Invisible Children and NGOs in general

At the height of viral sharing last night, Grant Oyston, a sophomore at Acadia University in Nova Scotia, created a Tumblr page simply to criticize the campaign. He wrote:

Invisible Children has been condemned time and time again. As a registered not-for-profit, its finances are public. Last year, the organization spent $8,676,614. Only 32% went to direct services (page 6), with much of the rest going to staff salaries, travel and transport, and film production. This is far from ideal for an issue which arguably needs action and aid, not awareness…

Oyston obviously doesn’t know what an advocacy organization is set up to do - to advocate. This is why a significant portion of its revenues go toward production costs and travel costs among other things. They make films. They send interns out on the road to give speeches and raise awareness. All of this costs money.

At the same time, the organization more recently begun implementing school-building projects and micro-credit initiatives to address the development aspect and an early warning radio network to try and get as many LRA combatants to defect - the earlier the better - so that they can be reintegrated into their communities. Invisible Children is a fairly young NGO, being less than a decade old, so it can hardly be blamed for not having grand-scale international operations at this point. It takes most NGOs a long time to set up overseas and a lot of them fail, and subsequently fold, in the process. 

But still, Oyston says he would prefer that the money be put overwhelmingly towards direct services - or action - over advocacy. Well, state actors won’t do anything to address a problem like this until there’s sufficient, or more likely, overwhelming public support. This is why you need awareness campaigns, and why an NGO needs to expend its revenue to make it happen. And let’s be clear, you can do all the development work you want right now, but so long as the LRA is still active, you’re taking one step forward and two steps back. Taking out the LRA requires state action. Getting state action requires public support. Getting public support requires awareness and advocacy.

But what this kind of talk, and mention of NGO ratings on charity navigator, is really about is a general suspicion of non-profits. Give me one person who says the Canadian Cancer Society does great work for an important cause, and I’ll give you another person who accuses it of having an interest in the perpetuation of cancer so that its employees can continue to make a living. This rhetoric needs to be confronted everywhere. The sad truth is that NGOs need to operate like businesses in a business world powered by money. They will incur costs and they will need to develop marketing strategies and so on. Some will figure out how to balance the costs with the cause better than others, but no matter the case, NGOs generally are a critical part of any democracy as well as the emerging global community. They do important work and should receive our benefit of the doubt, if not our donations. 

“White People Don’t Really Care Or Are Not Helping”

A number of older articles have been dug up by detractors who see them as proof that Invisible Children is fundamentally flawed in its perception of the cause it has taken up. Like this post:

Do not be fooled by slick video editing. Sleeping outside in downtown Pittsburgh will not help anyone who is still night commuting in northern Uganda. Perhaps you are now aware that there is a problem, perhaps you know that there is more to this world than just your country, your state, and your little hometown…It is up to you to figure out how to deal with this knowledge and the knowledge that your warm and fuzzy thoughts are not going to be the solution to this.

This negativity is even less of a solution. Honestly - how do you draw attention towards an issue without taking dramatic actions? Are those who participate in Invisible Children campaigns all going to be Rhodes scholars, fully versed in the intricacies of Ugandan and central African politics? Of course not. That’s not the point. The more people who get involved in a cause, even in minor ways, the more likely it is that the cause will find its way onto the international agenda. 

“The LRA Is No Longer A Threat”

The above article discusses a lot and, despite being dated, it’s helpful for anyone seeking a first-hand account of conditions in Uganda circa 2006. That being said, let me be the first to discount one of the fundamental assertions of the piece:

Uganda is no longer experiencing violence from the LRA. Yes, I said it. It’s an uncomfortable truth, but it is a truth. For about the last year, since before IC hit the scene, Kony and his troops have been pushed into Congo, into the Garamba National Forest there. He’s sick, starving, and on his last legs. For the first time, Uganda is in the middle of real peace talks and the rebels have laid down their arms and are assembling to make peace. Why? This is happening because Joseph Kony was defeated. 

This obviously didn’t happen and the peace talks were not “real”. The LRA was “negotiating” in Juba between 2006 and 2008 sparingly through the representation of Acholi exiles. The talks were rot with delays and complications and ultimately were only a stalling mechanism for Kony. In fact, during the talks, he was able to transfer remaining LRA units from South Sudan into Congo in order to fully regroup.

Many on the Ugandan side remained skeptical throughout the process as they had lived through Kony’s previous fake attempts to seek peace. Yet they still addressed almost all of the outstanding political and economic grievances held by Acholi society, which Kony had been claiming to represent for years. He had a chance to fix the root causes of the war, but instead decided that the deal just wasn’t personally enriching enough and so he never showed up to sign it.   

The Kony 2012 film and the subsequent backlash has confused everyone about where the LRA is and whether it’s still a threat. Indeed, it hasn’t been in Uganda since 2006. But let’s be clear - it is still active, and despite being made up of approximately 200-300 fighters, the LRA can still inflict unthinkable damage. Following Juba, the LRA spread into the surrounding countries of the CAR, DRC, and South Sudan, which are essentially lawless, ungoverned areas. Think about what kind of atrocities even just 10 LRA fighters with machetes could commit in defenceless villages. 

“Watch Out For Military Intervention”

So the LRA is not in Uganda. Uganda is experiencing peace for the first time in many years. Much needs to be done, including extensive peacebuilding and economic development. But should we just ignore the plight of defenceless civilians in CAR, DRC, and South Sudan?

Back to Grant Oyston:

[Invisible Children] is in favour of direct military intervention, and their money supports the Ugandan government’s army and various other military forces. Here’s a photo of the founders of Invisible Children posing with weapons and personnel of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. Both the Ugandan army and Sudan People’s Liberation Army are riddled with accusations of rape and looting, but Invisible Children defends them, arguing that the Ugandan army is “better equipped than that of any of the other affected countries”, although Kony is no longer active in Uganda and hasn’t been since 2006 by their own admission. These books each refer to the rape and sexual assault that are perennial issues with the UPDF, the military group Invisible Children is defending.

[..]

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has sent multiple missions to capture or kill Kony over the years. And they’ve failed time and time again, each provoking a ferocious response and increased retaliative slaughter. The issue with taking out a man who uses a child army is that his bodyguards are children. Any effort to capture or kill him will almost certainly result in many children’s deaths, an impact that needs to be minimized as much as possible. Each attempt brings more retaliation. And yet Invisible Children supports military intervention. Kony has been involved in peace talks in the past, which have fallen through. But Invisible Children is now focusing on military intervention.

Before I say anything, let’s be clear that Invisible Children revenues don’t go anywhere near the UPDF, the Ugandan national army. 

There is no question that over the course of the 26 year LRA conflict, the UPDF has committed many human rights abuses. In particular, many troops terrorized civilians that were forced into camps during the early 2000s as part of security measures taken by the state. Who are the guilty? We don’t know exactly since they’ve never been investigated. Should they be? Absolutely. Just as I would argue should be the case in Cote D’Ivoire now, anyone responsible for gross violations of human rights - no matter whether they’re the winners or the losers, the ‘good guys’ or the ‘bad guys’ - should be investigated and indicted by either the state or the ICC. 

All that being said, should the entire UPDF then be sidelined because of the actions of some? Should we allow the LRA to commit more atrocities unfettered while we condemn the UPDF as a monolith? Absolutely not. It is the most formidable army in the region and the only one with a chance of taking Kony down. The DRC, CAR and South Sudanese governments all at this point have very limited capacity to manage affairs within their own borders. Further, Uganda exported the LRA problem to these surrounding countries. It has a responsibility to make it right and stop the murder and abduction of civilians. 

Now, when it comes to military intervention and the US, all the alarm bells go off - and understandably. However, aside from the role that Uganda is playing in trying to stabilize Somalia, the US really has no interests in central Africa. This makes the deployment of the US special forces advisors this past October arguably one of the first military actions taken by the US that leans towards altruism. So we shouldn’t fear it. We need to give it a chance to work.

Oyston says no military action should be taken at all because of collateral damage and because it invites LRA retaliation. Collateral damage can be minimized by increasing efforts to produce LRA defections, which have been common over the past decade. And with respect to retaliation, how are we really to differentiate between regular LRA attacks and retaliation against military intervention? 

Anyone who thinks that a military solution to the LRA problem is too drastic and will only make matters worse has been living under a rock for the past 25 years. Oyston says peace talks in the past have “fallen through”. No, Kony sabotaged them purposely. We can’t just wait this out and we can’t try and reason politically with him. Kony has proven that he will not negotiate and that he will not seek peace. Rather, he’ll do whatever it takes to maintain his power in the jungle. Really - what recourse do we have? 

Finally, this post

Will simplistic explanations of long-running wars, delivered in a Facebook-friendly manner become the future of foreign policy? If the opinion of Rihanna and George Clooney is going to dislodge ‘technocrats’ who do things like read the Military Balance, then what’s to stop intervention in Syria? Pretty much everyone with a passing interest in military affairs says “that is a very bad idea and lots of people will die” but I’m pretty sure that a bright person with access to youtube can come up with a better argument for a brighter world in which taking Assad down is an expression of democratic empowerment. The point about war and military affairs is that at some point, it requires restraint. That restraint is entirely arbitrary (and unfair) but it stops people getting killed. If Angelina Jolie in combination with Condoleeza Rice are to dictate American strategy, then restraints to force will disappear into a blur of “Let’s go get the bad guy” activism that is almost entirely ignorant of the second and third order effects of those decisions.

This is ridiculous. That social media would ever deliver knee-jerk military interventions at the drop of a hat is needless hyperbole. Syria is a completely different issue and far more complex than the LRA conflict. And even still - with the whole world watching, policy makers are still exercising restraint as the author hopes. AVAAZ, a very effective online advocacy group has done a great job campaigning about Syria through social media. Will it trigger a military intervention without careful consideration? Doubtful. If there is intervention, it will almost certainly not be decided hastily. 

What It All Really Boils Down To…

These critics and others on Facebook and beyond share an uncomfortable (for them) similarity to Invisible Children and the so-called ‘half-hearted’ activists promoting the Kony 2012 campaign: they want attention. The backlash we’ve seen is mostly deep down an effort by detractors to get their cut of the action. They are probably a little bit bitter, a little bit anti-conformist, a little bit annoyed by their friends constantly sharing Kony hashtags and links on Twitter and Facebook. So, in the brief moment in which they harken back to the good old days of being flooded with Shit People Say videos, they capitalize. They are the unrelenting contrarian in your undergraduate politics class. They are your hyper conservative uncle who can’t wait to tell you about the latest thing Glenn Beck said and how it proves everything you believe to be hopelessly incorrect. They are not helping, and they don’t want to. 

To all the critics, don’t criticize something just because it gets bigger than you can tolerate. Yes, you might know the issue a little more than your friends, but they mean well and want to make a small gesture, however inconsequential. Meanwhile, those who support and donate to Invisible Children will not suddenly drop their expectation that the organization act responsibly. In fact, at this rate, there is no way that the organization will be able to avoid public accountability, even if it wanted to, given the global attention it’s receiving. 

So please, let it go. 

Update (11:42 EST): This is the first thoughtful critique I’ve read. It raises important questions about the root causes of the LRA conflict and emphasizes how they will still need to be addressed in order to achieve full positive peace in the region even after Kony’s removed. However, the contrast between Kony’s fame in the West versus that in central Africa is inconsequential here because IC has made no secret of its intent to focus awareness raising efforts on the West where he is far less known.

32 Notes

Kony 2012

I often write about a number of global human rights issues on this site, but few are more dear to me than seeing the arrest of Joseph Kony and the end of the Lord’s Resistance Army.

Kony is a misguided, sociopathic rebel leader that has exploited religious fundamentalism as well as the relative underdevelopment of northern Uganda to gain and keep power over people for over 25 years. He convinced disenfranchised Acholi Ugandans and forcibly abducted children to commit obscene atrocities in the name of God and ostensibly in opposition to Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. 

After repeatedly using Uganda’s lingering political disputes between north and south to buy time at the negotiating table, particularly in Juba, it became utterly clear in 2008 that he has no earthly desires other than power. His right hand man Vincent Otti - also previously wanted by the ICC - let it be known that he supported peace. Kony had him killed.

But despite being the first ever ICC indicted war criminal (2004), Kony has managed to stay under the international radar by carefully managing the amount of atrocities committed by his troops. God knows what goes through the mind of someone who actually tries to figure out exactly how many people to brutally mutilate and how many children to abduct without attracting too much attention but enough so that you don’t lose power and make people stop fearing you.

Invisible Children, an amazingly creative organization that uses film and music to inspire the world to end the LRA war in central Africa, is trying to end this cycle by making Kony famous. They are running a mock presidential campaign called Kony 2012, in sync with the US campaign, to try and keep US special forces advisors currently in Uganda there until Kony is arrested and increase international pressure to dismantle the LRA once and for all.

Watch the film here for all you need to know.

KONY 2012 from INVISIBLE CHILDREN on Vimeo.

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