An Open Letter to Kony 2012 Critics
Last night, we witnessed the global emergence of probably one of the fastest spreading social media campaigns ever. Since the LRA conflict is an area I’ve studied extensively in my master’s work, I was particularly overwhelmed by how many of my friends had watched the Kony 2012 film, passed it on, and committed to attending an April 20th ‘Cover the Night’ event in their city.
As I mentioned in a previous entry, Joseph Kony was the first war criminal indicted by the ICC in 2004 and his group continues to needlessly terrorize civilians in the DRC, South Sudan, and the CAR, so that it can maintain power in a climate of fear. In political circles, there is a rare amount of agreement surrounding this issue and what needs to be done. Kony needs to be arrested or killed, the LRA needs to be dismantled, and affected areas need to be reconstituted through reconciliation and economic development as well as through the reintegration of former LRA combatants into their communities, especially child soldiers.
The problem has always been finding the political will to take action in a part of the world that offers little in terms of strategic interests to the West. This is why awareness is so important. Further, since the conflict is indelibly tied to the ICC, how it plays out will have a critical impact on the credibility of such an important global institution and its ability to prosecute war criminals in the future.
Yet with so much at stake, beginning last night and continuing throughout today, there has been a sizable backlash to the Kony 2012 campaign, both on Facebook and Twitter and all over the web, including through the reposting of older articles. A number of general themes have emerged, which I’d like to address.
Suspicions About Invisible Children and NGOs in general
At the height of viral sharing last night, Grant Oyston, a sophomore at Acadia University in Nova Scotia, created a Tumblr page simply to criticize the campaign. He wrote:
Invisible Children has been condemned time and time again. As a registered not-for-profit, its finances are public. Last year, the organization spent $8,676,614. Only 32% went to direct services (page 6), with much of the rest going to staff salaries, travel and transport, and film production. This is far from ideal for an issue which arguably needs action and aid, not awareness…
Oyston obviously doesn’t know what an advocacy organization is set up to do - to advocate. This is why a significant portion of its revenues go toward production costs and travel costs among other things. They make films. They send interns out on the road to give speeches and raise awareness. All of this costs money.
At the same time, the organization more recently begun implementing school-building projects and micro-credit initiatives to address the development aspect and an early warning radio network to try and get as many LRA combatants to defect - the earlier the better - so that they can be reintegrated into their communities. Invisible Children is a fairly young NGO, being less than a decade old, so it can hardly be blamed for not having grand-scale international operations at this point. It takes most NGOs a long time to set up overseas and a lot of them fail, and subsequently fold, in the process.
But still, Oyston says he would prefer that the money be put overwhelmingly towards direct services - or action - over advocacy. Well, state actors won’t do anything to address a problem like this until there’s sufficient, or more likely, overwhelming public support. This is why you need awareness campaigns, and why an NGO needs to expend its revenue to make it happen. And let’s be clear, you can do all the development work you want right now, but so long as the LRA is still active, you’re taking one step forward and two steps back. Taking out the LRA requires state action. Getting state action requires public support. Getting public support requires awareness and advocacy.
But what this kind of talk, and mention of NGO ratings on charity navigator, is really about is a general suspicion of non-profits. Give me one person who says the Canadian Cancer Society does great work for an important cause, and I’ll give you another person who accuses it of having an interest in the perpetuation of cancer so that its employees can continue to make a living. This rhetoric needs to be confronted everywhere. The sad truth is that NGOs need to operate like businesses in a business world powered by money. They will incur costs and they will need to develop marketing strategies and so on. Some will figure out how to balance the costs with the cause better than others, but no matter the case, NGOs generally are a critical part of any democracy as well as the emerging global community. They do important work and should receive our benefit of the doubt, if not our donations.
“White People Don’t Really Care Or Are Not Helping”
A number of older articles have been dug up by detractors who see them as proof that Invisible Children is fundamentally flawed in its perception of the cause it has taken up. Like this post:
Do not be fooled by slick video editing. Sleeping outside in downtown Pittsburgh will not help anyone who is still night commuting in northern Uganda. Perhaps you are now aware that there is a problem, perhaps you know that there is more to this world than just your country, your state, and your little hometown…It is up to you to figure out how to deal with this knowledge and the knowledge that your warm and fuzzy thoughts are not going to be the solution to this.
This negativity is even less of a solution. Honestly - how do you draw attention towards an issue without taking dramatic actions? Are those who participate in Invisible Children campaigns all going to be Rhodes scholars, fully versed in the intricacies of Ugandan and central African politics? Of course not. That’s not the point. The more people who get involved in a cause, even in minor ways, the more likely it is that the cause will find its way onto the international agenda.
“The LRA Is No Longer A Threat”
The above article discusses a lot and, despite being dated, it’s helpful for anyone seeking a first-hand account of conditions in Uganda circa 2006. That being said, let me be the first to discount one of the fundamental assertions of the piece:
Uganda is no longer experiencing violence from the LRA. Yes, I said it. It’s an uncomfortable truth, but it is a truth. For about the last year, since before IC hit the scene, Kony and his troops have been pushed into Congo, into the Garamba National Forest there. He’s sick, starving, and on his last legs. For the first time, Uganda is in the middle of real peace talks and the rebels have laid down their arms and are assembling to make peace. Why? This is happening because Joseph Kony was defeated.
This obviously didn’t happen and the peace talks were not “real”. The LRA was “negotiating” in Juba between 2006 and 2008 sparingly through the representation of Acholi exiles. The talks were rot with delays and complications and ultimately were only a stalling mechanism for Kony. In fact, during the talks, he was able to transfer remaining LRA units from South Sudan into Congo in order to fully regroup.
Many on the Ugandan side remained skeptical throughout the process as they had lived through Kony’s previous fake attempts to seek peace. Yet they still addressed almost all of the outstanding political and economic grievances held by Acholi society, which Kony had been claiming to represent for years. He had a chance to fix the root causes of the war, but instead decided that the deal just wasn’t personally enriching enough and so he never showed up to sign it.
The Kony 2012 film and the subsequent backlash has confused everyone about where the LRA is and whether it’s still a threat. Indeed, it hasn’t been in Uganda since 2006. But let’s be clear - it is still active, and despite being made up of approximately 200-300 fighters, the LRA can still inflict unthinkable damage. Following Juba, the LRA spread into the surrounding countries of the CAR, DRC, and South Sudan, which are essentially lawless, ungoverned areas. Think about what kind of atrocities even just 10 LRA fighters with machetes could commit in defenceless villages.
“Watch Out For Military Intervention”
So the LRA is not in Uganda. Uganda is experiencing peace for the first time in many years. Much needs to be done, including extensive peacebuilding and economic development. But should we just ignore the plight of defenceless civilians in CAR, DRC, and South Sudan?
Back to Grant Oyston:
[Invisible Children] is in favour of direct military intervention, and their money supports the Ugandan government’s army and various other military forces. Here’s a photo of the founders of Invisible Children posing with weapons and personnel of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. Both the Ugandan army and Sudan People’s Liberation Army are riddled with accusations of rape and looting, but Invisible Children defends them, arguing that the Ugandan army is “better equipped than that of any of the other affected countries”, although Kony is no longer active in Uganda and hasn’t been since 2006 by their own admission. These books each refer to the rape and sexual assault that are perennial issues with the UPDF, the military group Invisible Children is defending.
[..]
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has sent multiple missions to capture or kill Kony over the years. And they’ve failed time and time again, each provoking a ferocious response and increased retaliative slaughter. The issue with taking out a man who uses a child army is that his bodyguards are children. Any effort to capture or kill him will almost certainly result in many children’s deaths, an impact that needs to be minimized as much as possible. Each attempt brings more retaliation. And yet Invisible Children supports military intervention. Kony has been involved in peace talks in the past, which have fallen through. But Invisible Children is now focusing on military intervention.
Before I say anything, let’s be clear that Invisible Children revenues don’t go anywhere near the UPDF, the Ugandan national army.
There is no question that over the course of the 26 year LRA conflict, the UPDF has committed many human rights abuses. In particular, many troops terrorized civilians that were forced into camps during the early 2000s as part of security measures taken by the state. Who are the guilty? We don’t know exactly since they’ve never been investigated. Should they be? Absolutely. Just as I would argue should be the case in Cote D’Ivoire now, anyone responsible for gross violations of human rights - no matter whether they’re the winners or the losers, the ‘good guys’ or the ‘bad guys’ - should be investigated and indicted by either the state or the ICC.
All that being said, should the entire UPDF then be sidelined because of the actions of some? Should we allow the LRA to commit more atrocities unfettered while we condemn the UPDF as a monolith? Absolutely not. It is the most formidable army in the region and the only one with a chance of taking Kony down. The DRC, CAR and South Sudanese governments all at this point have very limited capacity to manage affairs within their own borders. Further, Uganda exported the LRA problem to these surrounding countries. It has a responsibility to make it right and stop the murder and abduction of civilians.
Now, when it comes to military intervention and the US, all the alarm bells go off - and understandably. However, aside from the role that Uganda is playing in trying to stabilize Somalia, the US really has no interests in central Africa. This makes the deployment of the US special forces advisors this past October arguably one of the first military actions taken by the US that leans towards altruism. So we shouldn’t fear it. We need to give it a chance to work.
Oyston says no military action should be taken at all because of collateral damage and because it invites LRA retaliation. Collateral damage can be minimized by increasing efforts to produce LRA defections, which have been common over the past decade. And with respect to retaliation, how are we really to differentiate between regular LRA attacks and retaliation against military intervention?
Anyone who thinks that a military solution to the LRA problem is too drastic and will only make matters worse has been living under a rock for the past 25 years. Oyston says peace talks in the past have “fallen through”. No, Kony sabotaged them purposely. We can’t just wait this out and we can’t try and reason politically with him. Kony has proven that he will not negotiate and that he will not seek peace. Rather, he’ll do whatever it takes to maintain his power in the jungle. Really - what recourse do we have?
Finally, this post:
Will simplistic explanations of long-running wars, delivered in a Facebook-friendly manner become the future of foreign policy? If the opinion of Rihanna and George Clooney is going to dislodge ‘technocrats’ who do things like read the Military Balance, then what’s to stop intervention in Syria? Pretty much everyone with a passing interest in military affairs says “that is a very bad idea and lots of people will die” but I’m pretty sure that a bright person with access to youtube can come up with a better argument for a brighter world in which taking Assad down is an expression of democratic empowerment. The point about war and military affairs is that at some point, it requires restraint. That restraint is entirely arbitrary (and unfair) but it stops people getting killed. If Angelina Jolie in combination with Condoleeza Rice are to dictate American strategy, then restraints to force will disappear into a blur of “Let’s go get the bad guy” activism that is almost entirely ignorant of the second and third order effects of those decisions.
This is ridiculous. That social media would ever deliver knee-jerk military interventions at the drop of a hat is needless hyperbole. Syria is a completely different issue and far more complex than the LRA conflict. And even still - with the whole world watching, policy makers are still exercising restraint as the author hopes. AVAAZ, a very effective online advocacy group has done a great job campaigning about Syria through social media. Will it trigger a military intervention without careful consideration? Doubtful. If there is intervention, it will almost certainly not be decided hastily.
What It All Really Boils Down To…
These critics and others on Facebook and beyond share an uncomfortable (for them) similarity to Invisible Children and the so-called ‘half-hearted’ activists promoting the Kony 2012 campaign: they want attention. The backlash we’ve seen is mostly deep down an effort by detractors to get their cut of the action. They are probably a little bit bitter, a little bit anti-conformist, a little bit annoyed by their friends constantly sharing Kony hashtags and links on Twitter and Facebook. So, in the brief moment in which they harken back to the good old days of being flooded with Shit People Say videos, they capitalize. They are the unrelenting contrarian in your undergraduate politics class. They are your hyper conservative uncle who can’t wait to tell you about the latest thing Glenn Beck said and how it proves everything you believe to be hopelessly incorrect. They are not helping, and they don’t want to.
To all the critics, don’t criticize something just because it gets bigger than you can tolerate. Yes, you might know the issue a little more than your friends, but they mean well and want to make a small gesture, however inconsequential. Meanwhile, those who support and donate to Invisible Children will not suddenly drop their expectation that the organization act responsibly. In fact, at this rate, there is no way that the organization will be able to avoid public accountability, even if it wanted to, given the global attention it’s receiving.
So please, let it go.
Update (11:42 EST): This is the first thoughtful critique I’ve read. It raises important questions about the root causes of the LRA conflict and emphasizes how they will still need to be addressed in order to achieve full positive peace in the region even after Kony’s removed. However, the contrast between Kony’s fame in the West versus that in central Africa is inconsequential here because IC has made no secret of its intent to focus awareness raising efforts on the West where he is far less known.